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. Robinson LADB news analyst "The war between the unarmed poor majority and the armed
rich in the Caribbean's most tragic country has not yet begun in earnest," wrote a Haitian analyst
four years ago. "Despite intelligence, energy and often goodwill on both sides, inexperience, the
ruthless pressure of poverty and the perpetual shadow of a selfish neighbor to the north work
against a solution to the acute national crisis." Much has changed in the past four years. Yet there
remains in Haiti an unarmed poor majority, an armed rich, and an acute national crisis. "Plus
ca change, plus c'est la meme chose," goes the Haitian adage the more things change, the more
they stay the same. The bloody military coup staged last Sept. 30 against President Jean Bertrand
Aristide quashed the hopes for change kindled with the popular priest's stunning victory in the
December 1990 elections, and plunged the country into renewed conflict and uncertainty. The
Organization of American States (OAS) Human Rights Commission estimates the number of people
killed since the coup by the military at 1,500, while tens of thousands more have fled into exile.
Four months after Aristide's ouster, there is no solution in sight. The first independent republic
in Latin America Haiti's 7 million people are the most impoverished in the western hemisphere.
A full 85% of the population lives in poverty, 60% are unemployed, illiteracy surpasses 75%, and
infant mortality approaches 100 per 1,000 live births. Yet Haiti also boasts the distinction of being
the first republic in Latin America to achieve independence. In 1804, Haitian slaves staged a
successful revolt against French plantation owners. Within two decades, however, the mulattoes,
which represented 5% of the population and were free under the French colonialism, controlled
not only the reins of government but most of the nation's wealth. Thus began a century of conflict
and accommodation between the mulatto elite and the small black upper and middle classes. The
conflict was both exacerbated and transformed when the US Marines invaded the tiny republic in
1915 as part of Washington's efforts to displace the Spanish and other European competitors as
the dominant power in the Caribbean. At least 3,000 Haitians died fighting the US Marines, who
stayed on for 19 years. "The Haitians are negro for the most part, and, barring a very few highly
educated politicians, are almost in a state of savagery and complete ignorance," wrote a senior
State Department official in 1921. Therefore, "in Haiti it is necessary to have as complete a rule
within a rule by Americans as possible." Operating with a vicious racism not felt in the country
since the defeat of Napoleon's army, and with little understanding of the nation's peculiar history
and social makeup, the occupation forces assembled political structures responsive to outside
interests that only complicated internal political development and perpetuated Haiti's misery. The
US created a local army staffed by mulatto officers which, upon withdrawal of the Marines, became
the repressive and corrupt regulator of power and guardian of elite interests. Through cunning
manipulation of the inauspicious blend of local politics and US power, Francois ("Papa Doc")
Duvalier worked his way into power. In 1957, he was elected president, and soon after declared
himself "president for life," promising a stable alliance between the black and mulatto elite and
foreign interests. "Duvalierism without Duvalier" By overcoming the historic mulatto-black divide
among elites and winning support from the US, the Duvalier dynasty managed to remain in power
for nearly three decades. But popular protest against the dictatorship grew in the late 1970s and
into the 1980s. A burgeoning civil uprising finally sent Jean Claud ("Baby Doc") Duvalier into exile
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in February 1986. "Baby Doc" had come power upon the death of his father 15 years earlier, sworn
in as Haiti's second "president for life." Baby Doc's departure left intact most of the structures
erected by the dictatorship, including the hated Tonton Macoutes (paramilitary forces created by
the Duvaliers), and opened the way for a period of what many referred to as "Duvalierism without
Duvalier." Over the next five years, Haiti was submerged in a cauldron of turmoil: demonstrations
and conventions of opposition groups, shifts in the government, arrests and shootings, mass protests
and massacres. Over 2,000 Haitians died between 1986 and 1990. In 1986 shortly after Baby Doc's
departure, a Haitian told a foreign journalist: "We're glad Duvalier is gone, but this is not the end
of the affair, not by a long shot. The new government is perhaps a necessary evil, but it is certainly
not the choice of the people who struggled and sacrificed to get rid of Duvalier." Only a radical
rupture with the structures of the past, this Haitian argued, could extract Haiti from continual
political and social crisis. Ironically, the Haitian who made this comment would himself come to
symbolize just such a rupture: Father Jean Bertrand Aristide. At the time, the soft-spoken Catholic
priest was unknown outside of Haiti. But from his parish in the teeming Cite Soleil slum of Portau-Prince, the advocate of liberation theology became the indisputable leader of Haiti's struggle
for democracy. The transitional government that replaced Baby Doc, headed by Duvalier's former
military chief of staff Gen. Henri Namphy, announced plans to hold elections and develop a "real
and functioning democracy." However, in November 1987, elections were cancelled by Namphy's
junta on election day morning after the army opened fire on civilians at polling stations. The death
toll came to 34, and dozens more were wounded. Between 1987 and 1990, three coups took place
and another scheduled election was cancelled. Under pressure by mass public demonstrations, the
military finally allowed Supreme Court Justice Ertha Pascal-Trouillot to assume the presidency in
March 1990, until new elections could be held. Behind the scenes, the US Embassy placed additional
pressure on the military to allow elections, which were subsequently scheduled for December
1990. "Titid" and the Lavalas movement Meanwhile, from 1986 to 1989 a grassroots movement for
democracy was transformed into a popular revolt against the traditional structures of power and
corruption. By eliminating political parties, unions, media, and the rule of law, Duvalierism gave
birth to new forms of organization, based on loosely organized popular and civic groups operating
largely outside of the traditional political arena and independent from the country's major parties.
In early 1987, a total of 284 such national and local organizations came together to form the National
Congress of Democratic Movements (Konakom). Army efforts to derail the electoral process in June
of that year spawned the Group of 57, another multi-sectoral coalition. The grassroots base of the
Catholic Church, and particularly the "Ti legliz" (Christian Base Communities), played a major
role in the popular movement. By this time, Aristide, widely know by his nickname "Titid" ("little
Aristide"), had emerged as a voice for change, a symbol of the vision of a new Haiti. Consequently,
he was targeted by repeated assassination attempts, including the September 1988 attack on his
church, which was burned to the ground by Tonton Macoutes. During the attack, 12 parishioners
died and 78 were wounded. A year later, Titid was expelled from the Roman Catholic Selasian order
and lost his parish due to open political activity on behalf of the poor. He subsequently opened and
ran an orphanage in Cite Soleil. By 1990, Konakom and the Group of 57 had effectively joined forces,
forming what became known as the Lavalas movement ("avalanche"). The movement brought
together hundreds of thousands, and later millions, of poor Haitians from the teeming urban
slums and the impoverished countryside. Lavalas became the political and electoral expression of
all Haitians who aspired for a fundamental break with the old order. Distrust of formal political
parties and of an electoral process controlled from above a military junta supported from the US
led the popular groundswell to reject over 20 traditional candidates as the elections scheduled
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for December 1990 approached. Instead, several dozen civic groups associated with the Lavalas
movement formed a loose center-to-left electoral coalition, the Front for National Democracy
and Change (FNCD). The FNCD asked Aristide to run as its candidate. The Catholic priest at first
declined, but in October, just two months before the vote, he finally accepted the nomination, under
strong pressure Lavalas movement organizations. Within days of his nomination as presidential
candidate, two million Haitians, who had earlier shown little interest in the electoral process, rushed
to register, bringing the number of registered voters almost overnight from 40% to 90% of the
voting age population. Despite strong US support for Marc Bazin, a former World Bank official
and "moderate" technocrat who was considered the front-runner until Aristide entered the race,
Titid won 67% of the vote. Bazin captured barely 14%. A third candidate, the populist Louis Dejoie,
obtained 4.8%, and three other parties, including the Unified Haitian Communist Party, 1% each.
Over a dozen other parties won less than 1% of the vote. Taking place in the post-Cold War era,
and without formal links to traditional political parties (of the left or otherwise), much less to any
foreign powers, the popular revolt in Haiti in the late 1980s constituted a new and daring form of
social mobilization. As the first experiment with meaningful social change after the end of the EastWest conflict, the triumph of the Lavalas uprising represented not only a new option for the Haitian
majority but also new hope for the Caribbean and Latin America. President of the opposition The
tasks faced by the new government were overwhelming: implementation of popular reforms after
almost 200 years of entrenched corruption and dictatorship, reorganizing a chaotic and praetorian
state, applying sanctions to army officers for past abuses and coups, responding to the demands of
the continent's poorest population, and addressing one of the worst ecological crises in the Western
Hemisphere the near complete deforestation and soil depletion of the tiny country. At the time
of his inauguration, Aristide said, "Our major goal for the coming years and our basic program of
action is to go from extreme poverty to a poverty with dignity by empowering our own resources,
the participation of the people, and not expecting much from abroad." Aware that his administration
had to operate within the constraints of an anti-democratic state and bureaucracy and an "ancien
regime" yet to be dismantled, Aristide declared: "I will not be president of a government, I am going
to be president of the opposition, of the people, even if this means confronting the very government
I am creating." The quasi-insurrectional character of the Lavalas movement, the lack of an organized
national political leadership beyond the loose Lavalas structures, the countless demands inherent
in heading the government, and the short period of time before the new administration's mandate
was cut short, did not allow for any essential change in the dynamics of power. Among the programs
undercut by the coup was a national literacy campaign scheduled to begin in early 1992, and an
agrarian reform that would have set limits on the size of property holdings, channeled resources
to poor peasants and redistributed available lands. A communal reforestation program was also
in the planning stages, as well as the institutionalization of participatory democratic structures
alongside the formal governmental apparatus. Haiti and the "selfish neighbor to the north" In 1930,
the US governor in Haiti under the Marine occupation reported: "In general, while the Anglo-Saxon
has a...profound conviction of the value of democratic government," Haitians were unsuitable for
democracy. According to the governor, "in common with the Latin in general, [Haitians] are in the
main directed by emotion rather than by reason," and therefore "apt to scorn democracy." Fiftysix years later in 1986, the US Embassy arranged for Duvalier's safe departure to exile in France,
and then handpicked members of the interim government that replaced him. Next, Washington
prepared to guide the "transition to democracy." US economic aid jumped from US$55.6 million
in 1985 to US$77 million in 1986 and US$101 million in 1987. The Pentagon sustained the Haitian
military with a security assistance program which included training and anti-riot gear. In 1987, a
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State Department official asserted that while the Haitian army was problematic, "it's still the only
institution in Haiti at the present time [which can] hold the country together." The congressionallyfunded National Endowment for Democracy (NED), together with the State Department's Office
of Democratic Initiatives, spent over US$12 million in financing the December 1990 elections. In
an interview by the US-based weekly newspaper Times of the Americas, a US businessperson
with investments in Haiti said, "US neutrality in the elections was only theoretical. [Marc Bazin]
was adequately financed by the US Embassy to build a political machine." Bazin was seen as a
shoo-in for what was to be an election characterized by a high rate of abstentionism until Aristide
entered the race. Aristide was therefore the undesirable and unexpected outcome of the "transition
to democracy" that the US had attempted to lead. After the 1990 vote, observers were curious
about how Washington would respond. Having financed and tutored the electoral process, which
was monitored by over 1,000 foreign observers (including a team led by former president Jimmy
Carter), the Bush administration had little choice but to recognize the Aristide government. There
is no evidence of a US role in the coup, or that US officials had even given a nod to coup leaders.
However, according to the Washington Office on Haiti, several months before the coup the Bush
administration delayed disbursement of US$84 million in aid appropriated for Haiti, evidence of
"disapproval" of Aristide's programs. The Bush administration has condemned the coup under
pressure by the immediate and unanimous reaction from Latin American nations. Washington
also supported the economic sanctions imposed on the Haitian military regime by the OAS. In
early October, however, infighting broke out among in the administration over Haiti policy. The
New York Times (10/07/91) reported that administration officials "have begun to move away from
the unequivocal support they had voiced for the ousted Haitian President...With this shift, the
officials, who had said his reinstatement was necessary for the hemisphere's democracies to resist
a comeback of military rule, are now hinting that Father Aristide is at least to blame for his fall from
office." With the Haitian coup, concluded the article, "the administration was faced with the first test
of Mr. Bush's new world order in the Western Hemisphere." Critics of US policy say a typical double
standard is apparent in Washington's stance towards Haiti, given that a popular, leftist government,
and not a conservative US ally, was overthrown. They point out that the Bush administration has
made little use of the weight and influence it throws around elsewhere in the hemisphere. While
criticizing the coup, Washington has not seriously supported Aristide's return. The critics assert
that if the army overthrew Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro, for instance, US reaction would
have been radically different. "Democracy in Haiti means justice" Forces of the ancien regime are
bent on extinguishing the first spark of hope for democracy in Haiti's 180 years of tragic history as
an independent republic. In January 1991 on the eve of Aristide's inauguration, Roger Lafontant,
former Duvalier interior minister and Macoute leader, led a coup attempt. He asserted, "We cannot
allow a communist, elected by illiterates, to take power." Although Lafontant was captured and
subsequently killed by angry mobs following the abortive coup, remnants of the Tonton Macoute
have been reorganizing since the Sept. 30 takeover and the military government has managed to
quell popular protests. Foreign governments continue to express "profound concern," and the
OAS-led embargo has devastating effects on Haitian civilians. Meanwhile, the OAS mediates a
"solution" which would apparently restore Aristide to the presidency, but only if the military is
exempt from sanctions and substantive controls, and rightist forces in the legislature and traditional
political parties wield the real power. Leaders of the Sept. 30 coup were, ironically, the same young
officers Aristide promoted in the hopes of carrying out military reform. In December 1990, Raoul
Cedras was named to organize security for the electoral process. As a result, Cedras earned the
new government's respect for professional behavior, and was appointed provisional army chief in
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August 1991. Later, it became clear Cedras was a figurehead for an alliance of old guard forces in the
army and upper and middle classes. These "allies" tolerated Aristide for seven months and feared
that further consolidation of the first democratic regime in the country's history would irreversibly
threaten their privileges. The Washington Office on Haiti circulated a list after the coup of a dozen
businesspersons who reportedly spent over US$40 million to back Aristide's ouster. In his inaugural
address on Feb. 7, 1991, Aristide said, "In Haiti, democracy means social justice." Eight months later,
Gen. Cedras responded to Aristide's statement: "Aristide created enormous instability with such
fiery speeches, which finally provoked a corrective movement for democracy." The tragedy of the
Haitian republic continues. Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.

-- End --
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